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Abstract This study explores the differential impact of religious tradition, reli-
giosity, and everyday theologies on support for legalizing same-sex marriage among
a sample of undergraduate college students. The findings suggest that among college
students in the United States the group of everyday theologies—personal religious
beliefs that emerge through individuals’ lived experiences and social interactions—
that we examine has a larger influence on attitudes about legalizing same-sex
marriage than do either religious tradition or religiosity (measured as attendance,
prayer, and guidance). We operationalize the concept of everyday theologies as
levels of endorsement for six different religious themes. Implications for social
movements promoting same-sex marriage and future research are discussed.
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Introduction
Over the past few decades, support for lesbian and gay rights has increased (Avery
et al. 2007), with same-sex marriage being a focal point in the recent political
landscape of the United States. Currently, same-sex marriage is legal in 13 U.S.
states (California, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
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Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington),
Washington D.C., and among Oregon’s Coquille, with several other states in the
midst of legislative initiatives or judicial hearings that could eventually allow same-
sex couples to be legally married. As legislation and court cases move forward,
supporters and opponents of same-sex marriage continue to vocalize their opinions
in the public sphere. This includes a number of religious groups, with some having
played instrumental roles in recent legislative battles, mostly opposing the
legalization of same-sex marriage. The involvement of religious groups in the
same-sex civil marriage movement is not surprising given the historical influence of
religious institutions in defining romantic and intimate relationships (Herman 2001;
Warner 1993).
Research demonstrates that Americans’ opinions about legalizing same-sex
marriage are strongly influenced by religion (Herek 2006; Olson et al. 2006).
However, scholarship on the topic is limited in several ways. Sociological research
on religion has primarily attended to religious tradition—the faith and denomina-
tional tradition embraced by the individual—and religiosity—the devoutness or
importance of one’s faith in one’s life—while giving less attention to the actual
religious beliefs of individuals (Yamane 2007). The opposite pattern exists in the
social psychological research on religion wherein beliefs and religiosity are often
examined, but religious tradition is not (Batson and Ventis 1982). Few studies have
examined all three, potentially obscuring the possibility that religious tradition,
religiosity, and individually held religious beliefs all contribute uniquely to
attitudes. By failing to include all three, existing scholarship may have missed much
of the explanatory power of religion (Yamane 2007). It is to this gap in the literature
that this study speaks.
To better understand the role of religion in shaping opinions about legalizing
same-sex marriage, it is important to consider the role of personal religious beliefs,
or what Moon (2004) terms everyday theologies, in the context of religious tradition
and religiosity. ‘‘If we accept that social power works through beliefs, through
people’s deeply held understandings of the world, then it is all the more crucial… to
analyze their effects on people’’ (p. 8). And just as policies about same-sex marriage
are evolving, both in terms of governmental policy and denominational doctrine, the
same is likely true for individual opinions, as people’s everyday theologies evolve.
While there have been shifts toward greater endorsement for legalizing same-sex
marriage in the United States within generational cohorts in the last few years, the
clearest pattern is one across generations where young adults are more likely than
older generations to support legalization (Jones 2013). This makes young adults an
important population to examine in the context of the legalization of same-sex
marriage. However little is known about the role that religion plays among young
adults with regard to their attitudes about civil same-sex marriage. To advance
knowledge of the role religion plays in endorsement for the legal recognition of
same-sex marriage among young adults, among a sample of college students we
examine the explanatory power of everyday theologies, operationalized as
endorsement for six different religious themes, and that of religious tradition and
religiosity. Additionally, we test several hypotheses regarding various dimensions of
everyday theologies, while controlling for religious tradition and religiosity among
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a sample of college students. To create robust models, we also control for
demographic factors known to be important predictors of attitudes regarding same-
sex relationship recognition and same-sex sexuality. Alongside building scientific
knowledge, the results are informative for social movements aiming to promote and
foster support for legalizing same-sex marriage, as well as those opposed to such
efforts. Knowledge about how to frame issues to resonate with target populations to
gain support for social movement goals is central to shaping movement outcomes
(Benford and Snow 2000).
Religious Tradition, Religiosity, and Everyday Theologies
Although most Americans identify themselves with denominational labels (Kosmin
et al. 2001), such as Baptist, Catholic, or one of the over 2,000 denominations
present in the United States (Mead et al. 2005), denominational classifications have
not been particularly predictive in social science research. This has lead Yamane
(2007) to argue that the U.S. religious context is one of ‘‘belonging without
believing,’’ and some religion scholars to posit that sharper differences actually
exist along broader lines (Roof and McKinney 1987), that is, families of religious
traditions that share some historical and cultural similarities (Roof and McKinney
1987; Steensland et al. 2000). This religious tradition approach has been more
fruitful in social science research than the denominational classification approach,
and illustrates how different religious traditions can be seen to ‘‘array themselves
from morally conservative to liberal’’ (Yamane 2007, p. 42). Even so, there is still
significant variability in attitudes within specific traditions (Evans 2002; Smith
1998), thus the religious tradition approach—while an improvement over denom-
inational classifications—still has limited explanatory power, suggesting that
‘‘something other than religious tradition explains most of the difference’’ (Yamane
2007, p. 43) in attitudes on morality and other sociopolitical issues.
Religiosity, whether measured as the importance of religion in one’s life or as
participation in religious activities, has explanatory value above and beyond
denomination or religious tradition in predicting sociopolitical values and attitudes.
In fact, many differences between religious traditions become attenuated or
disappear once religiosity variables are added to statistical models (see, for example,
Gay and Lynxwiler 1999). Findings typically have indicated that increased levels of
religiosity tend to be associated with more politically conservative attitudes (Blasi
2006; Hicks and Lee 2006).
In many studies (see, for example, Finlay and Walther 2003; Bolzendahl and
Brooks 2005), it has been assumed that individually held religious beliefs are
congruent with the doctrine of the denomination to which individuals belong,
although they are not typically examined to determine if that is the case. When
actually evaluated, studies frequently conclude that individuals’ beliefs often vary
from their denomination’s doctrine (Woodford et al. 2012a, b; Moon 2004; Yamane
2007). The degree of doctrine-belief congruence varies both by faith tradition and
by topic (D’Antonio et al. 2001; Hoge et al. 1994; Poloma 1989). Moreover, the
doctrine-belief congruence assumption neglects to recognize the agency that people
have in their own spiritual journeys (Dillon 1999), and conceptualizes religious
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doctrine as a fixed phenomenon (Chaves 1997). Changes in the policies of some
Christian denominations about the ordination of openly gay/lesbian ministers in
recent decades are just one indicator of the changing nature of religious doctrine
regarding sexuality.
To understand the influence of religion on contemporary issues, we must attend
to individually held beliefs or what Moon (2004) calls everyday theologies, which
are the beliefs that emerge through social interaction with others. Moon argues that
one’s beliefs, while influenced by doctrine and scripture, are significantly shaped by
one’s lived experiences, and she demonstrates this in her ethnographic examination
of the discernment process undertaken by two different Methodist congregations
regarding issues of same-sex sexuality. She explains:
These ideologies are formed in communities and can help people to
experience religion as truthful and transcendent rather than as hollow human
tradition. People’s experiences teach them about life and shape what makes
sense to them. In this way, members’ understandings of Scripture are shaped
by their life experience. (p. 62)
For members of the congregations in her study, views about the church’s role in
dealing with social problems, the sinful nature of human beings, and pain and
suffering were religious themes inherent in their everyday theologies.
Though the concept of everyday theologies has been conceptually linked to
attitudes regarding same-sex sexuality in general (Woodford et al. 2012a) and same-
sex marriage specifically (Woodford et al. 2012b), this article is the first attempt to
investigate this concept empirically. Much of the literature on endorsement for same-
sex marriage focuses solely on religious tradition and religiosity; by including
everyday theologies, we hope to obtain a more nuanced understanding of the
underlying structure of attitudes toward civil same-sexmarriage among young people.
Everyday Theologies and Themes in the U.S. Religious Landscape
Alongside the religious themes that Moon (2004) identified, other religious themes
may also play a role in shaping opinions about civil same-sex marriage. Drawing
additional themes from the extant scholarship on the U.S. religious landscape, we
identify six religious themes as potential predictors of attitudes toward civil same-
sex marriage. Although some of these themes, namely moral absolutism/relativism
and universalism/anti-universalism, have been utilized in the literature on attitudes
toward same-sex sexuality (Giroux 2005; Yip 2003), this is the first study to use
multiple religious themes in examining attitudes toward legalizing same-sex
marriage while controlling for religious tradition and religiosity. Brief summaries of
the six themes and suggested hypotheses follow. More in-depth discussion of the
themes has been published elsewhere (Walls 2010).
The Social Gospel
Predominantly a mainline Protestant Christian intellectual movement that reached
its zenith in the early 20th century, the social gospel movement applies Christian
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principles to social problems, providing religious rationale to take action to address
these concerns (Bowman 2007; Rossinow 2005). The social gospel and other
similar perspectives, including liberation theologies continue to be relevant in
contemporary religious communities (Scimecca and Goodwin 2003; Todd 2011).
This aspect of Christian religion focuses on inequality, oppression, and liberation
from unjust social conditions and draws support from religious doctrines that focus
on God’s and Jesus’ treatment of the oppressed and the poor (Hook and Davis
2012); thus, belief in the social gospel may shape one’s support for same-sex
marriage. Given the importance of social gospel thought in liberal and mainline
Protestant theology and its primary focus on issues of oppression, it seems likely
that higher levels of support would be associated with higher endorsement for civil
same-sex marriage.
Human Nature
The nature of humanity is one of the most central beliefs in most religious
ideologies (Stevenson and Haberman 1998). Some faith traditions—particularly
conservative Protestant traditions—utilize an original sin framework and embrace
the idea that human nature is fundamentally sinful (Ellison and Sherkat 1993;
Minnick 1994). This may lead some to a ‘‘love the sinner, hate the sin’’ framework
(Bassett et al. 2002; Rine 2012; Yip 2003) that might promote conditional tolerance
of difference, but could still lead to the restriction of marriage rights based on the
view of same-sex acts as sinful. Given this, it seems likely that higher levels of
belief in the innate sinfulness of humanity would be associated with decreased
support for the legal recognition of same-sex marriage.
Perception of Pain and Suffering
Moon (2004) noted that ideas about pain were used by the congregations in her
study both to suggest that the church should affirm same-sex sexuality as part of
God’s gift of sexuality as well as to suggest that the church should play a role in
‘healing’ gay and lesbian individuals from their same-sex orientation. She argues
that the language of pain is ‘‘an appealing language for Christians because many see
it as a key theme in the teachings and life of Christ’’ (Moon 2004, p. 222). For those
who have undergone trauma or stress themselves, they may lean into religion as a
coping mechanism (Park 2005), potentially priming them to use religion as a source
of compassion for the suffering of others. Unjust suffering has been used as the basis
for a framework for making political demands for rights of many oppressed groups
(Moksnes 2005). As such, the belief that one brings pain and suffering upon
oneself—that is that the suffering is a result of one’s own failings—is likely to be
associated with decreased support for civil same-sex marriage.
Moral Absolutism/Relativism
The belief that moral authority is fixed and unchanging is a religious theme that
plays a role in the intensification of conflict between religious liberals and
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conservatives both within the same denomination and between denominations (Roof
and McKinney 1987; Wuthnow 1988). Evangelical Protestants tend to be the most
absolutist, while religious liberals tend to have a more relativistic notion of morality
(Hunter 1991; Sherkat and Ellison 1999). The tension between the two perspectives
has been influential in religious thought in the United States (Giroux 2005; Hopson
and Smith 1999) and is a central theme in Hunter’s (1991) culture wars. Absolutism
can influence religion through ‘‘traditional’’ narratives about sexuality, including the
reduction of sexual identity to ‘‘sinful’’ acts (Yip 2003). Moreover, absolutist beliefs
can prevent individuals from reconciling their personal religious beliefs with a
pluralistic and diverse society (Rine 2012). Absolutist beliefs have been linked to
anti-gay political movements in the United States (Giroux 2005), and as such, we
expect that higher levels of absolutist thinking will be related to decreased support
for legalizing same-sex marriage.
Anti-universalism/Universalism
Universalism emphasizes a concern for the welfare of all people, and generally
holds that all persons are related to and will be reconciled with God. While most
religious traditions claim goals of unconditional love, most actually practice a
circumscribed version that directs the selflessness of universalism only to members
of their particular religious in-group (Wuthnow 1991). Bassett et al. (2002) found
that devout Christians will offer assistance to gay and lesbian people, even if they
view same-sex sexuality as a sinful act, when they embrace a belief that affirms the
value of all people regardless of behaviors. Thus, we posit that those who embrace
universalism may look past their own beliefs and evaluations of gay and lesbian
people to support equal rights for same-sex couples, while those who embrace an
anti-universalist belief would likely oppose such rights.
Perception of Forgiveness
Themes of forgiveness are central to religious discourse (Lutjen et al. 2012;
Toussaint and Williams 2008; Tsang et al. 2005), and hence ideas about the concept
of forgiveness may play a role in people’s perspectives on controversial
sociopolitical attitudes, including same-sex marriage. It seems logical that higher
levels of believing in a God that freely forgives all would be associated with
increased support for legalizing same-sex marriage.
Attitudes About Same-Sex Marriage
In this section we outline the relationship between religious traditions, religiosity,
and the various religious themes examined in this study with attitudes about same-
sex marriage. Because of the limited scholarship in this area, at times we broaden
the discussion to look at more general attitudes about lesbian women and gay
men.
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Religious Tradition
Most studies indicate that individuals who identify as evangelical Protestants1 tend
to have the most negative attitudes toward same-sex sexuality and lesbian and gay
rights, including the legal recognition of same-sex relationships (Jones 2010; Pew
Forum on Religion and Public Life 2011). Jews and liberal Protestants tend to be
the most supportive of lesbian and gay rights of all religious groups, similar in
opinion to those who are secular or unaffiliated with religious institutions.
Catholics and mainline Protestants tend to fall somewhere in the middle (Finlay
and Walther 2003; Fisher et al. 1994). Strong religious tradition effects have been
found on attitudinal support for legalizing same-sex marriage and civil unions
(Olson et al. 2006; Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2003) and on
geographic voting behavior patterns on the topic (McVeigh and Diaz 2009; Sullins
2010).
Religiosity
High levels of religiosity and religious commitment have been fairly consistent
predictors of negative attitudes toward lesbian women and gay men (Fisher et al.
1994; Mohr and Sedlacek 2000) as well as increased opposition to legalizing
same-sex marriage. Jones (2010) found that among Americans who said that
religion was ‘‘very important’’ in their lives, 70 % opposed legalizing same-sex
marriage, while among Americans who said that religion was ‘‘not important,’’
71 % supported marriage laws inclusive of same-sex couples. Similarly, in another
study, 80 % of respondents with high levels of ‘‘religious commitment’’ opposed
legalizing same-sex marriage (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2003).
Assessing religiosity using measures of religious service participation has likewise
found greater levels of religiosity to be associated with greater opposition to legal
same-sex relationship recognition (Swank and Raiz 2010; Whitehead 2010). The
relationship with the private religiosity of personal prayer has not been previously
examined.
Everyday Theologies
Research on the relationship between the six religious themes explored in this study
and attitudes about same-sex sexuality or the legalization of same-sex marriage is
virtually non-existent. Giroux (2005) and Yip (2003) suggest that moral absolutism
plays a substantial role in the opposition to lesbian and gay rights, and given that
evangelical Christians tend to be higher in moral absolutism, this may be one of the
underlying themes that explains part of the historically anti-same-sex sexuality
stances held by many evangelical Christians. Relatedly, Bassett et al. (2005) found
that individuals who scored lowest on a subscale measuring openness to religious
1 Various studies have sometimes defined this group as fundamentalists, sometimes as conservative
Christians, and sometimes as having been ‘born again.’
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questions and highest on a subscale measuring foreclosed/nonreflective faith—two
aspects of religiousness that are likely related to moral absolutism—were the most
rejecting of lesbians and gay men. In their exploration of same-sex marriage, Olson
et al. (2006) found that those who prioritized ‘moral issues’—a topic similar to
some of our religious themes—were significantly more likely to oppose legalizing
same-sex marriage than those who did not.
Two recent studies that considered individual-level religious syncretism
concerning same-sex sexuality—that is how much respondents agreed or disagreed
with their religion’s stance on ‘‘homosexuality’’—have produced interesting
findings. Among the studies’ samples, level of agreement with one’s church’s
teachings on same-sex sexuality was not correlated with levels of sexual prejudice
or support for same-sex marriage for those in denominations that did not teach that
‘‘homosexuality’’ was a sin, but was significantly correlated for those whose
denominations taught that ‘‘homosexuality’’ was a sin (Woodford et al. 2012a, b).
While significant theorizing about some religious beliefs examined in this study
exists, particularly regarding the beliefs of universalism and moral absolutism, little
empirical research has been undertaken to examine the relationships between these
beliefs and sociopolitical attitudes, including civil same-sex marriage. It is to this
task that we now turn our attention.
Hypotheses
As our primary hypothesis for the study, we anticipate that the model testing
everyday theologies (i.e., the set of religious beliefs) will be a stronger predictor of
attitudes toward legalizing same-sex marriage than either the model testing
religious tradition or the model testing religiosity. Further, we have a set of
secondary hypotheses predicting the relationships between the dependent variable
and religious tradition, religiosity, and the individual religious themes which
follow.
Given the literature on the relationship between religious tradition and attitudes
toward lesbian women and gay men, and civil same-sex relationship recognition
policies, we anticipate that respondents who identify as secular, Catholic, and
liberal/mainline Protestant will be more likely to support the legalization of same-
sex marriage than those who identify as evangelical Protestants. This difference
should be most evident between evangelical Protestants and seculars. Similarly,
based on extant literature, we expect that higher levels of religiosity will be
associated with less support for legal recognition of same-sex marriage.
There is less empirical support to guide hypothesizing about the relationships
of the various religious themes examined herein on attitudes about the
legalization of same-sex marriage. However, given that the scholarship on
religion provides evidence of how these themes map onto religious traditions, we
have extrapolated from those relationships to suggest a preliminary hypothesis
for each of the six religious themes explored in this study (See above and
Table 1).




Participants in the study were undergraduate students enrolled in introductory
sociology courses at six U.S. colleges and universities. Five of the research sites
were private universities, including two Catholic-affiliated schools, one Mennonite-
affiliated college, and one Baptist-affiliated university. The sixth school was a
public university in the Midwest. A total of 651 respondents completed the survey;
however, 27 respondents (4.1 %) were excluded from the analytical sample due to
missing values on one or more of the variables examined in the study. Females are
overrepresented in the sample which is not uncommon in samples from sociology
courses (American Sociological Association, Research and Development Depart-
ment [ASARDD] 2006) as well as undergraduate students, generally (The Chronicle
of Higher Education 2010). Compared to sociology majors and undergraduate
students overall, racial/ethnic minority students are underrepresented (ASARDD
2006; The Chronicle of Higher Education 2010).
Measures
Demographics
We inquired about gender (male, female), race and ethnicity, political ideology,
family income, and family size. Because of low cell counts, American Indian/Native
American, Biracial/multiracial, and Other were combined into other race/ethnicity.
Table 1 Survey items and secondary hypotheses regarding religious themes of everyday theologies
Everyday theologies theme Survey item Hypothesized direction
of relationship
Social gospel There is little that religion can do
about the problems of society,




Human nature as sinful Although people are naturally base
and sinful, they can rise above
these instincts and do great things
that are pleasing to God
Decreased support for
same-sex marriage
Perception of pain and suffering as
brought on by self








Anti-universalism There is only one true religion Decreased support for
same-sex marriage
Perception of forgiveness as given to
all




(R) indicates that the item was reverse coded for analyses. The theoretical range for each religious theme
is 1–7, with a higher score indicating stronger endorsement
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Political ideology was captured through the use of a seven-point Likert scale
(1 = strongly liberal, 7 = strongly conservative). To measure family income,
respondents selected from 12 categories ranging from Under $5,000 to $105,000
and over. The lowest two categories were combined into one and recoded as ‘Under
$20,000’ ($20,000 for statistical analysis) and the final category of $105,000 and
over was combined with the $95,000 to $104,999 category and recoded as
‘$100,000 or more’ ($100,000 for statistical analysis). All other categories were
recoded to the midpoint of the category.
Religious Tradition
The set of religious tradition variables were derived from three questions. The first
asked, ‘‘What religion do you consider yourself?’’ with a response set of Buddhist,
Christian, Hindu, Islamic, Jewish, No religious belief/Agnostic/Atheist, and Other
(please specify). A second question asked those who identified as Christian to place
themselves in a religious tradition category. It asked, ‘‘If you are Christian, which of
the following categories best describes you?’’ The response set listed families of
religious traditions (e.g., Catholic, mainline Protestant) based on Steensland et al.’s
(2000) schema. Finally, as an additional check on classification, respondents were
asked, ‘‘What is the actual name of the church you attend or consider yourself to be a
part of (this information is for denominational classification purposes only)?’’ and
were given a place to enter the name of their church. From these three questions a set of
religious tradition variableswas derived based on the Steensland et al. (2000) schema.2
Religiosity
Following the lead of Eggebeen and Dew (2009) who argue that religiosity is a
multidimensional construct that includes participation behaviors—both public and
private—as well as importance, we utilize three variables to capture religiosity.
Respondents were asked, ‘‘Do you go to religious services … more than once a
week to never?’’ (public participation [attendance]; 6-point Likert scale), ‘‘Outside
of attending religious services, do you pray…several times a day to never?’’ (private
participation [prayer]; 5-point Likert scale), and ‘‘Would you say your religion
provides… little or no guidance to a great deal of guidance in your day to day
life?’’ (guidance; 4-point Likert scale). Scores were (re)coded so that higher
numbers on each scale equate to higher levels of religiosity.
Everyday Theologies
To capture the concept of the six themes of everyday theologies, respondents were
asked questions related to each theme. These questions were embedded in a section of
2 Liberal and mainline Protestants were combined given the small number of respondents who identified
as liberal Protestants. Black Protestants were not designated as a separate category due to the small
number of African Americans in the sample, and initial analyses which indicated that African American
Protestants (the majority of African Americans in the sample) were not significantly different on the
dependent variable than White evangelical Protestants. No respondents identified as Jewish in the sample.
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the survey asking about a wide range of values, ethics, and beliefs. Each of the
questions was answered with a seven-point Likert scale response set ranging from
Strongly agree to Strongly disagree. All questions were (re)coded for usage such that
higher numbers represented increased endorsement of the attitude (See Table 1).
Endorsement for Civil Same-Sex Marriage
To capture support for civil same-sex marriage, respondents were asked, ‘‘Same-sex
couples should have the right to marry one another in the U.S.’’ with a seven-point
response set (1 = Strongly agree, 7 = Strongly disagree). The variable was recoded so
that those who agreed (strongly, somewhat, or slightly) were coded 1 to represent
endorsement, while those who neither agreed nor disagreed, slightly disagreed,
somewhat disagreed, or strongly disagreed were coded 0 to represent non-endorsement.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics for the demographic, religious traditions,
and religiosity. Correlations of variables can be found in Table 3 and regression
results in Table 4.
The sample was predominately White and female. The largest percentage was
raised in an urban area, and had a family income of slightly more than $70,000.
Nearly 40 % of the sample identified as Catholic, followed by 33.8 % as evangelical
Protestants. In terms of religiosity, the students, on average, reported attending
services almost every week, praying a few times each week, with religion offering
quite a bit of guidance in their lives.
Concerning the religious themes, those endorsed (mean scores greater than the
midpoint of the scale) overall by the sample include the belief that God’s forgiveness is
freely given, the perception that humans are naturally base and sinful, and moral
absolutism. Landing in the center of the scale (indicating neither agreeing nor
disagreeing) are the endorsement of social gospel beliefs, and the belief that people
bring suffering on themselves. The mean concerning the belief that there is only one true
religion fell on the disagreement side of the scale (i.e., B3.5). Turning to our dependent
variable, 43.8 % of the sample endorsed the legalization of same-sex marriage.
Regression Models
We used logistic regression to predict support for legalizing same-sex marriage.3
Models 1 through 3 combine the set of demographic control variables singularly
with religious tradition, religiosity, and the everyday theology religious themes,
3 Ordinal logistic models were explored since the original form of the dependent variable was an ordinal
Likert scale. The overall patterns found were similar to those found using logistic regression and, as such,
the decision was made to report the logistic models as they are much more familiar to readers and do not
entail the parallel regression assumption risks endemic to ordinal logistic models (see Long 1997).
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics,
demographic characteristics and
religion variables





African American 34 5.45
Asian American 22 3.53
Latino/a 38 6.09
Other race/ethnicity 20 3.21
White 510 81.73
Urbanicity
Open country/farm 86 13.78
Small town (under 50,000) 159 25.48
Suburban (near a large city) 144 23.08




Strongly liberal 33 5.29
Liberal 115 18.43
Slightly liberal 73 11.70
Middle of the road 148 23.72
Slightly conservative 89 14.26
Conservative 135 21.63
Strongly conservative 31 4.97
Family size 4.52 (1.64)
Religious tradition
Conservative Protestant 211 33.81






A few times a year 137 21.96
Once or twice a month 76 12.18
Almost every week 80 12.82
Once a week 171 27.40
More than once a week 81 12.98
Prayer
Never 68 10.90
Once a week or less 123 19.71
A few times a week 134 21.47
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respectively. This allows us to determine how each set of religion variables
performs without the influence of the remaining religion variables. Model 4
combines the control variables with all three sets of religion variables. The drop in
deviance test (Ramsey and Schafer 2001) statistic indicates the explanatory power
of each model, with a lower score suggesting a better performing model among
nested models, while the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) difference is used
for the same purpose among non-nested models (Rafferty 1995). Our primary
purpose is not to determine the relative weight of each of the predictors compared to
one another; however, in addition to reporting the adjusted odds ratios (AOR) and
standard error for the final model, we also include the standardized coefficients in
order to capture some of the nuanced relationships. Because of the collinear
relationship of the religion variables, variance inflation factors and the condition
number for the models were examined, and the condition number for all models
reported was below 30 as recommended (Belsey et al. 1980). To take into account
that data were collected in six different school settings, the cluster option in Stata
12.1 was used to control for possible non-independence among clustered data.
Model 1: Religious Traditions
The religious traditions model finds, as predicted, that seculars, Catholics, and
liberal/mainline Protestants were all significantly more likely to support civil same-
sex marriage than evangelical Protestants (p\ .001, for all three). Seculars were 7.4
times as likely to support extending marriage rights to same-sex couples than
evangelical Protestants (the largest difference, as predicted), Catholics were 2.4
times as likely, and liberal/mainline Protestants were 1.5 times as likely. Those
reporting a non-Christian religious tradition were also at increased odds of
supporting legalizing same-sex marriage (p\ .05, 3.7 times as likely). Using the
drop in deviance test, we found that the addition of the religious tradition variables
significantly improved the model fit over the control variables model (p\ .001).
Model 2: Religiosity
In the second model, the religiosity variables were added to the demographics
controls. Prayer was statistically significant (p\ .05), while neither attendance nor
Table 2 continued
Variable n %/M (SD)
Once a day 130 20.83
Several times a day 169 27.08
Guidance
Little or no guidance 80 12.82
Some guidance 177 28.37
Quite a bit of guidance 176 28.21
A great deal of guidance 191 30.61
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Table 4 Multiple logistic regression of support for legalizing same-sex marriage on demographics,
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guidance reached a level of statistical significance.4 The AOR of 0.83 suggests that
for every one point increase in frequency of prayer (on a five-point scale), there is a
17 % decrease in likelihood of supporting legalizing same-sex marriage. Based on
these results we would anticipate that, on average controlling for all other variables
in the model, a person who never prays would be approximately 88 % more likely
to endorse civil same-sex marriage than a person who prays several times a day. The
model is a statistically significantly better fitting model than control variables model
(p\ .001).
Model 3: Everyday Theology Themes
In the third model, the variables capturing the six religious themes of the everyday
theologies were added to the demographic variables. Neither believing that humans
4 The religiosity variables are strongly correlated with one another (see Table 3). As such, additional
models were run entering each religiosity variable into the demographic variables-only model
individually as well as entering a combined religiosity index variable (a = .82). Individually each
variable reached a level of significance as did the religiosity index variable (p\ .001; models not shown).
By entering all three religiosity variables, which represent three dimensions of religiosity into the same
model as we have done, the model suggests that private behavior (prayer) has the strongest relationship















































N 624 624 624 624
McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 .494 .490 .582 .603
Deviance 588.32 590.66 541.76 528.54
AOR adjusted odds ratios, SE standard error
*** p\ .001; ** p\ .01; * p\ .05
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are naturally base and sinful, nor perception of God’s forgiveness being given freely
to all reached a level of significance, however, the remaining four religious theme
variables did. Contrary to our hypothesis, an increased endorsement of social gospel
was associated with decreased support for legalization of same-sex marriage
(p\ .001, AOR = 0.75). For every one point increase in endorsement of the social
gospel perspective (on a 7-point Likert scale), there is a 25 % decrease in likelihood
of supporting legalization of same-sex marriage. Consistent with our hypotheses,
perception of pain and suffering (p\ .01, AOR = 0.80), moral absolutism
(p\ .001, AOR = 0.72), and anti-universalism (p\ .01, AOR = 0.86) were each
associated with decreased support for civil same-sex marriage. Specifically, higher
levels of belief that one has brought on one’s own pain and suffering were
associated with decreased support for legalizing same-sex marriage, representing a
20 % decrease in likelihood that the respondent supported civil same-sex marriage
with everyone point increase in endorsement of blaming pain and suffering on the
person experiencing it. Likewise, for every one point increase in endorsement of
moral absolutism, there is a 28 % decrease in likelihood that the respondent
supported legalized same-sex marriage. Similarly, higher levels of endorsement of
the belief that there is only one true religion were also associated with decreased
support for civil same-sex marriage representing a 14 % decrease in likelihood that
the respondent supported extending marriage rights to same-sex couples with every
one point increase in endorsement of anti-universalism. As predicted, the model
with religious themes is a better fitting model than the control model, the religious
tradition model (Model 1), and the religiosity model (Model 2).
Model 4: Full Model
In this model, religious tradition, religiosity, and the six religious themes were all
added to the demographic controls concurrently. With regard to religious tradition,
Catholics and seculars continue to be significantly different than evangelical
Protestants in their reported levels of support for the dependent variable. In
particular, Catholics were 1.7 times as likely (p\ .01) and seculars were 3.6 times
as likely (p\ .001) to support legalizing same-sex marriage than evangelical
Protestants. Liberal and mainline Protestants as well as those from non-Christian
faith traditions were no more or less likely to support civil same-sex marriage than
evangelical Protestants. None of the religiosity variables were significant predictors
in the combined model. Finally, the pattern of relationships between religious
themes and the dependent variable stayed almost the same as in Model 3 (religious
beliefs), specifically some changes in AOR values were observed and the statistical
significance of perceptions of pain and suffering increased. In terms of the
standardized coefficients, as seen in the final column, although the observed effect
sizes of all of the religious variables were small and many were fairly similar, the
everyday theologies themes of moral absolutism and social gospel demonstrate the
highest effect sizes (b = -.21 and b = -.20, respectively). Comparing this model
with the control model and the three nested models, we find the final model to be a
significantly better fitting model than all of the other models.
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Demographic Findings Across All Models
Across all models reported, the demographic controls performed consistently with
much of the literature concerning attitudes about lesbian women and gay men, or
support for same-sex relationship recognition. Males, those with conservative
political views, and those from larger families were significantly less likely to
support legalizing same-sex marriage. With one exception, any racial and urbanicity
differences that reached levels of significance in preliminary models, were not
significant in the final model. The one exception is the consistent finding across
models that Asian Americans were less likely to support civil same-sex marriage
than Whites (p\ .05).5
Discussion
Yamane (2007) observed that in order to understand the role of religion on
sociopolitical beliefs, it is necessary to consider religious tradition, religiosity, and
individual-level religious beliefs. Consistent with this assertion and our primary
hypothesis, we found that the model that controlled for everyday theology themes
offered greater explanatory power than the model controlling for religious traditions
and that controlling for religiosity, and that the final model which controlled for all
religious factors offered the most explanatory power. Given this, this discussion
focuses primarily on the final model and the implications that arise from its findings.
At times, however, comparison with prior models is made to illuminate important
points.
Concerning religious tradition, although significant in the religious tradition-only
model, the difference between liberal/mainline Protestants and evangelical Protes-
tants disappeared with the addition of religiosity and the religious themes in the final
model. This suggests that some qualitative difference in an aspect (or combination
of aspects) of how religion is practiced and understood is what differentiates liberal/
mainline Protestants from evangelical Protestants in terms of support for legalizing
same-sex marriage among college students. Post-hoc analysis suggests that the
primary difference between liberal/mainline Protestants and evangelical Protestants
that explains their difference in opinion on civil same-sex marriage is endorsement
of moral absolutism. The addition of only the moral absolutism variable to Model 1
(religious traditions; post hoc model not shown) results in the significant difference
between the two religious traditions disappearing, suggesting that the primary
difference undergirding these religious traditions in terms of support for legalizing
same-sex marriage is the belief in moral absolutism.
Shifting our attention to religiosity, we found that in the presence of religious
traditions and the six religious themes, none of three types of religiosity examined
herein significantly predict support for legalizing same-sex marriage. In models
where only one type of religiosity is entered at a time with the demographic
variables, each religiosity variable reaches statistical significance (models not
5 The level of statistical significance was p\ .001 for Models 2, 3, and p\ .01 for Model 4.
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shown). However, in the analysis that combined the demographics with all three
types of religiosity (Model 2), only the prayer variable retained statistical
significance, suggesting that it is more influential than the other two types of
religiosity in predicting the dependent variable. Post-hoc analyses examining the
influence of the set of religious traditions and each of the six religious themes
individually on the relationships between prayer and support for the dependent
variable (models not shown) did not provide a clear pattern of which of these
influences individually best explained this loss of significance, suggesting it is a
combination of factors that is responsible.
Taken all together, these findings suggest that religiosity—in and of itself—may
have a smaller role to play in opinions about civil same-sex marriage among young
people than the actual context of that religiosity. That is not to say that religiosity is
not important, but rather that its relationship to sociopolitical opinions among
undergraduate college students likely varies based on the specific religious context.
This proposition is logical given that religious commitment combined with a strong
moral absolutist opinion would likely have a very different impact on attitudes
about extending marriage rights to same-sex couples than religious commitment
combined with strong beliefs in universalism, or that high levels of religiosity for
evangelical Protestants may mean something very different than high levels of
religiosity for Catholics in the context of opinion about legalizing same-sex
marriage. These findings mirror those of recent studies conducted by the authors
(Woodford et al. 2012a, b), whereby the strength of agreement or disagreement with
religious doctrine on same-sex sexuality varies based on the actual doctrine. In the
larger picture of scholarship on religion, these findings suggest that scholars need to
re-examine the fairly well established relationship between religiosity and attitudes
about same-sex marriage, as well as attitudes about lesbian and gay people, to
determine how the influence of religiosity functions differently in various religious
tradition contexts and in relationship to various religious beliefs.
Finally turning our attention to the influence of everyday theologies, operation-
alized herein as six different religious themes, we found that the addition of
religiosity and religious traditions to the religious beliefs model did little to change
the impact of social gospel, perception of pain and suffering, moral absolutism, and
anti-universalism on support for legalizing same-sex marriage among college
students. As was found when controlling for demographics and the religious themes
(Model 3), each of these variables was negatively associated with support for civil
same-sex marriage in the full model. These results provide partial support for our
secondary hypotheses concerning the role of specific religious themes (human
nature as sinful and perception of forgiveness were not significant).
Contrary to our hypothesis, we found that increases in the social gospel
perspective were associated with decreased support for legalizing same-sex
marriage. Based on the idea that liberal and progressive religions have historically
endorsed the deprivatization of religious beliefs from personal belief to sociopo-
litical action to address the social problems of the world, the original hypothesis
posited that increases in the social gospel perspective would be associated with
increased support for legalizing same-sex marriage. What might explain the
significant finding in the opposite direction? A number of scholars have documented
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that a substantial shift has occurred in conservative Protestant churches. Histori-
cally, these churches have seen their responsibility as saving souls rather than
putting energy into remaking the world according to their view of God’s plan
(Marsden 1980; Regnerus and Smith 1998). However, in the last couple of decades,
these churches have embraced an activist stance whereby one aspect of being a
‘good’ Christian is the deprivatization of one’s faith. This has resulted in increased
influence in the political marketplace for conservative Christians (Geest 2007; Piven
and Walzer 2007). So, while liberal and mainline Protestants have historically seen
it as their Christian duty to shape society into their progressive view of God’s plan
for the world—a view more in line with left of center political ideas—conservative
Protestants, have more recently embraced a similar notion, but with a view of God’s
plan that is substantially more reactionary and based on traditional notions of
gender, sexuality, and morality. It is possible that this shift of increased
deprivatization may play a role for young adults and their stance toward civil
same-sex marriage.
Limitations
Though this study advances knowledge concerning the role of religion and support
for civil marriage, several limitations are noteworthy. Even though this study
utilized a sample from six different universities to increase variability, it is based on
an undergraduate student, convenience sample. Two concerns with such samples are
typically raised: the stability of young adults’ sociopolitical attitudes and the lack of
generalizability. Regarding the first point, the existing empirical evidence on the
stability of political attitudes of young adults provides only weak support for the
idea that young adults’ attitudes are significantly more dynamic than those of
middle-aged and older adults (Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Sears 1983). The second
concern regarding generalizability is an issue that should be kept in mind when
reviewing the findings. Because the findings are not generalizable to the general
public, nor even generalizable to all student populations, replication with other
populations is needed. In addition to political identity, the religious identity of
young people may also be in flux (Fowler 1981), especially for those attending
university or college (Chickering and Reisser 1993; Pascarella and Terenzini 2005).
Because the sample was recruited from social science courses there is an expected
over-representation of females in the sample. While the gender differences that
emerge are in the direction anticipated, the low percentage of males in the sample
may have obscured some relationships that vary based on gender.
Another concern is that the religious themes examined in this study are assessed
by single-item variables rather than indices that might better capture the
multidimensionality of complex religious beliefs. Empirically reliable indices were
not available for this study, thus further work developing and using such indices
would substantially strengthen the findings.
Finally, given the data are cross-sectional, the findings should not be interpreted to
suggest causality.While religious beliefs, traditions, and religiositymay indeed have a
causal relationship with attitudes about legalizing same-sex marriage, it is also likely
that attitudes about this topic may cause religious people to critically re-examine their
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religious affiliation and beliefs. In fact, embedded in the notion of ‘‘everyday
theology’’ is the idea that there is a fluid, bidirectional relationship between these types
of sets of variables.
Implications
The findings of this study have a number of implications for social movements,
especially those engaging young adults, as well as future research. Consistent
with earlier studies (Moon 2004; Woodford et al. 2012b; Yamane 2007), the
current findings highlight that social movements working toward the legalization
of same-sex marriage should be careful not to dismiss the support of certain
religious communities based on the belief that members of those communities
oppose the legalization of same-sex marriage because their denomination belongs
to a conservative tradition or is opposed to civil same-sex marriage.6 Although
the probability of someone from certain faith traditions (e.g., evangelical
Protestant) supporting the extension of marriage rights to same-sex couples may
be less than someone from a tradition with more progressive doctrinal stands
(e.g., Catholic), there is still variability in support for legalizing same-sex
marriage within all of the religious traditions. In congregations (or denomina-
tions) that are taking a public stand against pro-lesbian/gay policy, Moon (2004)
demonstrates that norms about dissent may be at play that foster the appearance
that there is uniform agreement with the stance within the group even when that
is not the case. Likewise, the assumption that a congregation associated with a
historically progressive denomination will be supportive of civil same-sex
marriage could lead to problems whereby pro-same-sex marriage community
organizers and activists face resistance where they assumed there would be little
to none.
A potentially more helpful barometer of people’s views on legalizing same-sex
marriage are the everyday theologies that they embrace—particularly ideas about
the social gospel and the endorsement of moral absolutism. While this study is
cross-sectional in nature and cannot provide evidence of cause and effect, one
intriguing notion of influencing people’s opinions on same-sex marriage laws would
be to engage them in critical dialogues about these underlying religious themes and
develop social movement strategies and frames that resonate with their endorsement
of these everyday theologies. Additionally, if we embrace the notion that Moon
(2004) suggests whereby people’s theologies shift according to life experiences and
in community with others, then working at the level of these religious building
blocks may be one way in which to effect change in attitudes about civil same-sex
marriage in an indirect manner.
Concerning research, the results suggest that building conclusions on the
assumption that individual belief equates with the doctrine of their faith tradition is
6 Given that many organizations that oppose same-sex marriage are based on religious ideologies, those
organizations have relied heavily upon the support of religious communities and have thus, not dismissed
religious communities in the same manner that pro-same-sex marriage organizations have.
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highly problematic. The findings add to a growing body of literature that
demonstrates that this is simply not the case on certain topics. It also suggests
that some aspects of everyday theologies may be potentially more important than
either religious tradition or religiosity in predicting attitudes toward some
sociopolitical issues.
The loss of significance of the religiosity variables, specifically prayer in the final
model suggests that religiosity may mean quite different things for different
religious traditions or for people who endorse different religious beliefs. This raises
concerns for a substantial body of literature that has equated higher levels of
religiosity with more negative attitudes toward lesbian women and gay men and
same-sex relationship recognition rights. The context of religiosity appears to
matter, thereby signifying the need to explore interaction effects between religiosity
and religious tradition or between religiosity and endorsement of various religious
beliefs. Additionally, the performance of the various religious variables across the
models as well as conceptual ideas about the functioning of the religious beliefs also
suggest that future research may want to examine religious beliefs as mediating
factors between religious traditions and religiosity and sociopolitical attitudes.
There are obviously still other factors that influence opinions on marriage laws
that need to be explored. The gender effect maintains significance across all the
models suggesting that religious variables do not explain the difference in opinion
on legalizing same-sex marriage between men and women. Other variables, such as
endorsement of traditional gender roles, social dominance orientation, or right-wing
authoritarianism may be part of the belief structure that explains this difference.
Similarly political ideology (significant in all models) does not appear to be
influenced by the addition of the religious variables, suggesting the need for delving
below the blunt measure of political ideologies on a liberal-conservative continuum
to understand what underlying political beliefs—everyday politics?—may be at
work.
Finally, psychological mechanisms likely undergird the relationships uncovered
in this study between religious beliefs and support for legalizing same-sex marriage.
Understanding these mechanisms could provide more insight into the symbolic and
psychological meaning of the religious beliefs and the process by which they are
translated into sociopolitical attitudes.
Much work remains to be done to understand young adults’ (and the general
public’s) attitudes about policies concerning same-sex marriage. Though appeals to
political themes such as equality, fairness, and democracy are no doubt an important
part of the strategies that may be useful for same-sex marriage advocates and
organizations, failure to recognize and address the importance of religious
motivations could very well result in a substantial portion of young people (and
others) in the United States remaining staunchly committed to the denial of
marriage rights for same-sex couples. Failure to utilize religious themes in pro-
same-sex marriage messages misses opportunities that have the potential to resonate
with citizens who have, for the most part, been dismissed by the same-sex marriage
legalization movement as unchangeable.
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